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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
BANKRUPTCY.
As the trustee in bankruptcy is subject to the orders of the
court, it might seem that a person would not be allowed to
refuse to serve merely on the ground that there are
Fruee no assets from which his fees could be paid. How-
ever In re Levy, ioi Fed. 247, decides that where
the bankrupt files the affidavit that he has no means and is
unable to pay even the preliminary costs, the court has no
power to require a person to serve as trustee unless the creditors
furnish his advance fee or otherwise arrange with him.
In In re Hoadley, IoI Fed. 233, the bankrupt was a devisee
under will of his father, whereby the latter left his property to
his wife for life, remainder to the children of tes-
Contingent tator who should then be living, in equal shares,
Estate the issue of a deceased child taking their parent's
share. The District Court (S. D. N. Y.) held that under the
law of New York the estates of the children of the testator
were contingent until the death of the widow, therefore no
interest passed to the trustee in bankruptcy of one of them
who became bankrupt prior to that time.
The District Court (E. D. N. Y.) has decided that an action
for breach of promise of marriage, followed by the seduction
of the plaintiff, is an action of contract and within
Mrriae 01 the terms of the bankruptcy act, therefore a judg-
ment in such an action is discharged by the dis-
charge of the judgment debtor in bankruptcy: Zn re McCauley,
IOI Fed. 223.
CARRIERS.
In Lewis v. Chesapeake Rwy. Co., 35 S. E. 9o8, the defendant
railroad received goods for consignment to a steamship com-
Dlivery to pany, the bill of lading providing that defendant's
Wharfo liability should cease upon delivery "to the steam-
Steamship ship company or on the steamship pier at the
Company port." The goods were delivered upon a pier
owned and controlled by the railroad company, but which the
steamship company was permitted to use, and were there
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destroyed by fire. The Court of Appeals of West Virginia
held (i) that the bill of lading contemplated a delivery upon a
wharf of the steamship company and not upon one of the
railroad, and (2) that even if the latter construction were in-
tended, it would be void as an unreasonable attempt of the
carrier to escape the duty of delivery.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Under the fourteenth amendment it is one of the "privi-
leges" of a citizen of the United States to make use of the
Ntional flag of the United States as an advertisement for
Flag a selling goods, and a state statute forbidding such
Advertising an use of the flag deprives him of his property
Medium without due process of law. So the Supreme
Court of Illinois decides in Rushstrat v. People, 57 N. E. 41,
holding that the police power is not broad enough to cover
cases of mere "sentiment." Cartwright, C. J., and Wilkin and
Carter, J J., dissented, and, though no dissenting opinions ap-
pear, we imagine that a very strong one could be written.
It was formerly held that although a state could not tax an
agency of the federal government, yet the United States could
State Agency, tax at pleasure the agency of a state. However,
Taxation by since the case of U. S. v. B. & 0. R. R., 17 Wall.
United States 322, the rule has been different, and it is now held
that the taxing power of the United States is limited to the
same extent as that of the states. But, in U. S. v. Owens,
ioo Fed. 70, Judge Adams, of the Circuit Court (E. D. Mo.),
carries the doctrine of state exemption a little too far in
holding that the United States has no power to impose a
stamp tax on a bond given by a saloon keeper, who has
received a license, for the proper conduct of his business. The
opinion proceeds upon the ground that the granting of the
license, in return for the bond, constitutes a contract between
the licensee and the state, which is clearly wrong. The judge
says that since the United States could not tax the license, it
cannot tax the bond. Granting that no tax could be imposed
upon the license, the conclusion arrived at does not follow by
any means.
It is well settled that the constitutional provision in regard
to public trials is to be interpreted in a reasonable manner and
Public Tis, does not deprive courts of a certain amount of
Discretion discretion in regard to the conduct of cases.
of Court People v. Hall, 6.4 N. Y. Suppl. 433, applies this
principle to a statute passed tocarry out the constitutional
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mandate. The New York Civil Code (§ 5) provides that the
sittings of every court shall be public and every citizen may
freely attend the same, except that in trials and actions on
certain named subjects the trial judge shall have authority to
exclude all but interested persons. The Supreme Court of
New York held that even where the trial involved a subject
not mentioned in the exception of the statute, the court had
authority to exclude from the court-room the spectators
probably drawn there by desire to hear the loathsome details
of- the case
While the legislature may require that notice of intention
to bring an action against a municipal corporation must be
Notice o given within a specified time after the accrual of
Intention to the cause of action, yet such requirement of notice
Bring Suit must be reasonable. So where it was provided in
a village charter that no action for personal injuries against
the village could be brought unless the plaintiff gave notice
to the village of his intention to sue, which notice must be
received within forty-eight hours after the accident, the Su-
preme Court of New York held the provision void, as
depriving the plaintiff of a property right under the fourteenth
amendment to the constitution of the United States: Green v.
Pillage of Port Jarvis, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 547.
CONTRACTS.
Ever since the case of Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Ad.
621, it has been a mooted question whether or not, when a
Reward for reward is offered for certain information, the infor-
inormation, mation must be given with the express purpose of
Purpose of obtaining the reward, in order to constitute a
nformatin binding contract. Vitty v. ley, 64 N. Y. Suppl.
397, holds that, under the New York rule, (I) the information
must be given with the knowledge of the reward, and (2) it
must be given for the express purpose of obtaining the reward,
so that (3) the reward is not earned by the informer if the
information is extorted from him by threats of arrest.
Henry v. Rowell, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 488, is a questionable deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of New York, which should be
Brea of appealed. In 1872 A. and B. entered into a con-
contract to tract whereby A. promised to board and lodge B.
M"ke Will, for the rest of her life, in consideration for which
imlt*tions B. promised to leave all her property by will to A.
B. boarded with A. until 1884, when she left A. without cause
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
CONTRACTS (Continued).
and did not return to the end of her life, in 1898, when it
appeared that she had not left A. all her property. In an action
by A. against the estate, it was held that the only breach of
contract occurred in 1884, when B. repudiated it, and not in
1898, therefore A.'s cause of action was barred by the statute
of limitations.
CORPORATIONS.
In Johnson Co. v. Clamber of Commerce, 82 N. W. 795, the
Supreme Court of Michigan discusses the nature of the
rAssessments power given by the charter of a corporation to
for Annual the directors to assess annual dues against the
Dues. Debts stockholders. It was held (I) that such a power
authorizes assessments only for the incidental expenses of the
corporation and not for the purpose of paying its general
indebtedness, and (2) where the directors have assessed and
collected the dues for a certain year, a corporate creditor can-
not maintain a creditor's bill to compel the directors to levy
an extra assessment.
Where an electric corporation receives permission from a
city to erect poles and wires, which it maintains for a number
of years, the city is estopped from alleging that
Attack upon the act under which the corporation was incorpo-
Franchise rated gave it no power to conduct such a business
and that the franchise conferred upon it by the city was void:
Electric Co. v. Wyandotte, 82 N. W. (Mich.), 821.
The Illinois courts follow consistently the doctrine of the
Supreme Court of the United States that an ultra vires con-
ultra Vires tract is absolutely void, and no amount of ac-
Contract, ceptance of benefits by the corporation will render
Estoppel it liable on such a contract. The latest Illinois
case on the subject is Best Brewing Company v. Klassen, 57
N. E. 20, where a brewing company became surety upon an
appeal bond of a liquor dealer, a clearly ultra vires act. The
Supreme Court of Illinois decided that the fact that the effect
of the bond, in enabling, the dealer to continue his business
and thus purchase the brewing company's beer,--even if such
facts would constitute a benefit in the eye,of the law,-did not
estop the company from pleading the invalidity of the con-
tract. Of course this rule does not apply where the contract
is intra vires, but merely irregular: Brewing Co. v. Flannery,
137 Ill. 309.
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In State v. Hill, 35 S. E. 831, the Court of Appeals of West
Virginia reversed a conviction for burglary upon a seemingly
Burglary, immaterial point. The indictment alleged that the
Indictment, goods were stolen from a car of the "Pittsburg,
Variance Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Com-
pany, in the custody of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company." On trial it appeared that the car belonged to the
"Pittsburg, Cleveland, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Com-
pany," which was in the custody of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Company. It was held that the variance was fatal,
even though the court admitted that it was unnecessary to
specify the actual owner of the car in the indictment, since.
the car was both alleged and proved to have been in the
custody of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, which
special ownership would have been sufficient to support con-
viction under the indictment. The decision seems to violate
the general modem rule that variance in an immaterial point
is not fatal.
Under the Indiana decisions it would seem that where a bar-
tender illegally sells liquor on Sunday in violation of the
express orders of the proprietor of the saloon, and,Ia s e, without the knowledge of the latter, the proprietor
Knowledge. is not guilty of a criminal offence: Rosenbaum v.
State, 57 N. E. 156.
COURTS.
The general jurisdiction of the federal courts over actions
for penalties and forfeitures is vested in the District Courts.
Suit under The United States Statute (§ 629, R. S.) gives the
Copyright Circuit Courts jurisdiction of "all suits at law or
Law equity arising under the patent and copyright
laws." It having been decided that a suit to recoverthe pen-
alty of one dollar for having possession of each copy of an
infringed photograph, was a penal one (Brady v. Daly, 20
Sup. Ct. 64), the question arose whether such suit should be
brought in the District or the Circuit Court: Falk v. Curtis
Pub. Co., IoO Fed. 77. Judge Dallas, of the Circuit Court (E.
D. Penna.) while remarking that the point had never been
decided directly, held that the Circuit Court could properly
hear the case, although the jurisdiction in such cases was
probably concurrent.
DAMAGIES.
In Kraemerv. Met. Street Rwy. Co., 64 N. Y. Suppl. 618, the
plaintiff sustained injuries to her knees, whereby she expended
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Excessive $r,6oo on physicians and nurses, was unable to
Damages walk for eighteen months after the accident and
would probably never be able to walk any great
distance or up and down stairs without suffering considerable
pain. The Supreme Court of New York held that a verdict
of $i5,ooo was excessive and ordered a new trial conditioned
upon the plaintiff's refusal of a judgment for $7,000, together
with the amount of the actual expenses.
DEEDS AND MORTGAGES.
The doctrine of incorporation by reference has grown up
as a part of the law of wills, but there is no reason why it
incorporation should not apply equally to the case of other
by Reference instruments in writing. Thus a Connecticut
Statute (§ 3016) provides that certain chattels may
be mortgaged by a deed containing "a particular description
of such personal property, executed, acknowledged and re-
corded as mortgages of land." In Surely Co. v. Cycle Co., wo
Fed. 40, the mortgage itself did not contain a description of
the chattels, but referred to a schedule which was annexed
and recorded at the same time. The schedule itself was not
subscribed or acknowledged. The Circuit Court (D. Conn.),
very properly held that the application of the doctrine of in-
corporation by reference caused the schedule to become part
of the mortgage, so as to render it valid under the statute.
IVIDENCE.
In Comm. v. Reagan, 56 N. E. 577, Hammond, J., of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts gives an interesting discus-
Compeny sion of the respective duties of the court and jury
of Witnesses, in regard to the competency of witnesses. The
Province of principal point decided was that when a witness is
Cou t a objected to on the ground of his youth, the ques-
Jury tion of his competency is for the judge alone.
Thecourt then discussed the case of the offer of a confession,
which is objected to on the ground that it is involuntary; say-
ing that it is the duty of .the court to decide in the first
instance, even where the testimony is conflicting. In Pennsyl-
vania it would seem that it is a question wholly for the jury.
See Comm. v. Epps, 193 Pa. 512.
INSURANCE.
In Cannon v. Ptwnix Ins. Co., 35 S. E. 775, the Supreme
Court of Georgia discussed the liability of an insurance coin-
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"Friendly" pany for a "friendly" fire as opposed to its liability
ad for an "hostile" fire. In that case policy insured
..Hostie" against "direct loss and damage by fire," and the
Firm damage complained of was caused by a stovepipe
which refused to work, flooding the rooms with soot, and
heating the woodwork so that water had to be used to cool it.
Held, that since the only fire in question was contained in its
proper place, the stove, the damage to the building was not
caused by an hostile fire within the meaning of the policy.
The medical examiner of an insurance company has no
power to waive non-compliance with the terms of the policy.
Waiver, Thus in Desmond v. Benevolent Legion, 64 N. Y.
Authority of Suppl. 4o6, the applicant stated to the medical
officers examiner that he had never applied for insurance
in that association before, and his answers were warranted to
be true in his application; whereupon the examiner passed him,
and the policy was issued. It appeared that several years before
the applicant had applied for insurance in the association and
had been rejected by the same medical examiner, who had
made a note of the rejection in his books. The Supreme
Court of New York decided that even if the medical examiner
was chargeable with knowledge of the former application, his
action could not be construed as a waiver, since it was beyond
the scope of his authority.
In contrast to the above case may be cited Allison v. Steven-
son, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 481, decided by the same court at the
same term, to the effect that where a by-law of the association
provides that the insured may designate the beneficiary by
filing with the association a writing duly signed and ac-
knowledged as a will; and a paper, not acknowledged, is filed
with the treasurer of the association, by whom it is retained
without objection until the death of the insured, the associa-
tion is deemed to have waived compliance with the by-law.
